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Abstract
Engaging with recent ideas about the moral evaluation of art, I argue that facts about
the lifestyle, attitudes, and moral character of music performers are relevant to
evaluating a musical performance. When it contributes to a better understanding of
the performance, this knowledge contributes to a more accurate estimation of its
aesthetic merits and flaws. I explain how my view departs from those of Berys Gaut
and Jeanette Bicknell.
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1. Introduction
There is an important view in philosophy of art, aesthetic autonomism, which holds
that aesthetic values are independent of other sources and kinds of value. Although
it was often treated as an essential axiom of aesthetic theory, the dominance of
aesthetic autonomism is waning. The burden of proof seems to have shifted, so that
the burden now falls on those who maintain that the aesthetic and the ethical are
mutually exclusive categories of value judgment. In that spirit, I proceed on the
assumption that autonomism is mistaken and that ethicism requires no defense. My
positive contribution is my argument that influential formulations of ethicism continue
to concede too much to autonomism when the position is applied to musical
performance.[1] I propose that the ethical attitudes of performers are sometimes
partially constitutive of the aesthetic flaws and merits of their musical performances.
My position relies on two major assumptions. First, I accept ethicism as a general
theory about ethical and aesthetic value: ethical assessment has bearing on
aesthetic assessment. Second, my emphasis on sources stems from recent
arguments against aesthetic empiricism.[2] Aesthetic empiricism is the position that
the aesthetic value of any object of appreciation depends only on those non-
aesthetic properties that are directly perceived in it.[3] In contrast, ontological
contextualism proposes that facts about artistic provenance are often relevant to
shaping the aesthetic properties that emerge from non-aesthetic ones. Aspects of a
work’s history can make an aesthetic difference. Although ontological contextualism
was expressly developed in order to accommodate artistic modernism, it does not
stand or fall simply as an account of the aesthetics of recent fine art.[4] It can also
shed light on our interactions with objects and events that are not necessarily
artworks, including popular entertainment.[5]
I develop my argument in relation to popular music. Although a great deal of ethical
condemnation of popular music relies on empirically doubtful claims that
impressionable listeners will be harmed by its pernicious influence, that is not my
concern. Nor do I wish to turn back the clock to the era when critics ranked the
“relative excellence” of stories, films, and artworks according to their capacity to
positively transform our values and thus behavior.[6] My aim is to advance the claim
that ethical judgments about musicians can be relevant to the aesthetic experience
of – and therefore the value of – their music. Expanding upon an insight supplied by
Jeanette Bicknell, I propose that this version of ethicism is particularly apt for
evaluating popular music. However, the first step is to align ethicism and ontological
aesthetic contextualism.
2. Contextualism
Ontological contextualism is well known in contemporary philosophy of art as a
result of Arthur Danto's endorsement of it: “the aesthetic qualities of the work are a
function of their own historical identity, so that one may have to revise utterly one's
assessment of a work in the light of what one comes to know about it.”[7] Consider
Kendall Walton’s well-known example of Pablo Picasso’s Guernica (1937). Walton
argues that its precise expressive character is determined by its degrees of similarity
and dissimilarity to other cubist paintings, and to its having originated as a painting
rather than, say, a sculpture. If an identical image appeared within a tradition of bas-
relief sculpture rather than twentieth century cubism, the artwork would be either
very dull or very serene. However, it would certainly be a mistake to perceive it as
violent and dynamic—which Picasso’s Guernica is.[8] Thus, a proper appraisal of
Guernica’s aesthetic value depends, in part, on knowing some facts about Picasso,
the artist.
Applied to music, contextualism implies that what sound like two indistinguishable
performances of the same musical work may in fact be performances of two very
distinct works, and those two works may possess very different aesthetic
properties.[9] Similarly, different performances of the same work will have different
properties as a result of being generated in different contexts. The identity of the
performer, I argue, is one such relevant contextual factor. For example, the order of
performance can make a difference, as when a singer’s interpretation of a song that
is already closely associated with another singer counts as a “cover” version and so
gains an aesthetic complexity that may have been lacking in the earlier version (e.g.,
Sid Vicious singing “My Way.”)[10]
As a first step in showing that the ethical evaluation of performers can play an
important role in aesthetic evaluation of performances, I will take a detour into the
topic of food consumption. In particular, I want to connect contextualism and disgust.
Although there may be some people who select food strictly on the basis of its
nutritional value, they are certainly not the norm. Most people are influenced by the
manifest properties of our food, especially how it looks and tastes. (Manifest
properties are any that are directly apparent in seeing, smelling, tasting, and so on.)
However, aesthetic responses to food are also influenced by its non-manifest
properties. Although it is a staple source of animal protein, many Americans and
Europeans recoil at the thought of eating goat and drinking goat milk. Eel, squirrel,
snake, and a host of other tasty creatures are also widely shunned by food
consumers who can afford more expensive proteins. Others reject beef, pork, and
poultry on the grounds that they are produced under cruel conditions, or on the
grounds that the cognitive abilities of these species make them unsuitable for
consumption. In short, food choices are guided by a combination of economic,
aesthetic, and ethical considerations.
Carolyn Korsmeyer is particularly insightful on how contextual factors influence
aesthetic evaluations of food. Here is a morsel of what she says about food and
disgust:
Living within a religious milieu that prohibits the eating of pork, for
example, inculcates the belief that pork is inappropriate food. The
relevant cognitive assessments become exceptionally strong
evaluations, such as “pig products are abominable.” The assessment
also takes a strong visceral form: the smell of bacon is nauseating. …
Upon discovering that one has accidentally eaten pork, perhaps …
food believed to have been made of something else, one may feel
retrospective nausea and be disgusted by the past event of eating
pork.[11]
The first important lesson here is that the aesthetic response of feeling disgusted
can be influenced by a cognitive component: beliefs about origins. Although disgust
is among our most basic emotions, it is not restricted to an instinctive, non-cognitive
response to manifest properties. Turning from aesthetic judgment to aesthetic
properties, a second point is that aesthetic properties are not confined to whatever
we immediately perceive. They accrue to complex, ongoing experiences.
Consequently, we often formulate retrospective aesthetic responses that differ from
our occurrent responses to what was perceptually apparent to us. Third, Korsmeyer
observes that there is “overlap between core [visceral] disgust and moral disgust ...
when disgust is brought about by human agency with injurious purpose.” I think that
the same point holds in cases where there is no injurious purpose. Upon learning
that the delicious restaurant meal that I ate the previous evening was prepared in a
kitchen where someone on the kitchen staff has hepatitis and poor hygiene, my
retrospective disgust is justified even if I believe that exposure to the virus arose
from ignorance and laziness rather than bad intentions.[12] Finally, the relevant
injury may be to someone or some animal in the past, and not an injury or threat for
the person making the aesthetic judgment. It is not unreasonable to translate ethical
sympathy for ducks and geese who are mistreated in the production of foie gras into
aesthetic disgust in the stuff itself.
Sadly for ducks and geese, modern aesthetics is rife with arguments for autonomism
rooted in aesthetic empiricism, encouraging us to ignore their unseen history when
the foie gras arrives at the table. Contrary to the tradition inaugurated by Kant, it is all
but impossible to avoid cognitive spill-over in the case of food.[13] Following his
precedence, autonomists might responds to Korsmeyer’s cases of retrospective
disgust with the argument that disgust, directed at food, is not an aesthetic
response. As it was developed into the twentieth century, Kantian autonomism was
frequently employed to support the view that a wide swath of cultural activity—
including food consumption—is resistant to disinterestedness and therefore to
aesthetic judgment.
Ironically, Kantian autonomism shielded fine art from ethical censure while offering
no such protection for “low” culture. Falling beyond the sphere of what is
aesthetically valuable, popular culture does not trigger the autonomist’s prohibition
against ethical evaluation. In practice, one of the most notable examples is the so-
called Hays Code, which supported ongoing censorship of Hollywood movies for a
significant portion of the twentieth century.[14] Yet during the same period, the legal
system of the United States increasingly protected images, language, and narratives
that would be prosecuted as obscene in popular culture. The erotic content of
James Joyce’s Ulysses is one among many prominent cases. This difference in
treatment — ethical autonomism for fine art but only for fine art — is increasingly
recognized to be an unjustifiable double-standard. Popular music seems to have
received a disproportionate share of abuse as a result of this double-standard.
The lesson here is that although ontological contextualism was developed to make
sense of developments in the artworld of the twentieth century, we employ a double-
standard if we assume that contextualism only applies to fine art. Provenance makes
an aesthetic difference. Ethical dimensions of provenance make an aesthetic
difference with food. So why not popular music, too?
3. Composers and provenance
Ontological contextualists debate whether knowledge of provenance of music
requires knowing the identity of the music’s composer. It cannot always make a
difference; there are many musical traditions where sophisticated listeners are not
concerned with it. Focusing on the Western classical tradition, the composer’s
identity is of varying relevance. On the one hand, there are traditions where that
information does not seem to matter. We do not know who composed the traditional
fiddle tune “The Soldier’s Joy.” However, I think that evaluation of its aesthetic merits
can go awry if one hears it while under the false impression that it was composed by
Gid Tanner, an American, in the late 1920s—based, perhaps, on the fact that
Tanner recorded it with The Skillet Lickers in 1929. In that case, the tune could merit
interpretation as a nostalgic and perhaps even reactionary, and thus racist, assertion
of Dixie pride. Although that might be a proper reading of Tanner’s version and a
number of other performances of it, it would be a mistake to regard it as true of all
performances: the tune predates Tanner by centuries. Yet how would it profit us to
get the time and place of composition exactly right? It would make little or no
aesthetic difference to learn that it is the only surviving composition by a Scottish
Highland fiddler named Gilburt Burns, circa 1642, rather than the only known tune of
a fiddler named Patrick Walker, of Stirling, in the Lowlands, and dating from about
1657. On the other hand, we have traditions and genres where such information is
highly relevant. As Jerrold Levinson observes, had Richard Strauss composed music
in 1897 that sounded just like Arnold Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire (1912), Strauss’s
music would not be the same musical work, for it would be expressively and
aesthetically very different from Schoenberg’s composition.[15] Here, a change of
composer and a gap of fifteen years are very significant.
Because facts about a work’s composer are sometimes aesthetically relevant, and
because a work’s ethical flaws are sometimes aesthetically relevant, I think the
burden of proof falls on those who think that a work’s ethical flaws can be
aesthetically relevant and yet a composer’s ethical flaws remain irrelevant. Tradition
aside, why do we think that the moral purposes and moral quality of an artwork can
always be determined in the absence of a judgment about the moral character of the
artist? Yet it appears that way to Berys Gaut, who narrows the range of what is
ethically relevant to elements within the work: “the artist’s attitudes manifested in the
work … are a central object of ethical assessment.”[16] Elsewhere, he is clear that
the attitudes manifested in the work are restricted to “artistic acts performed in the
work.”[17] Everyone expresses different attitudes on different occasions and in
different contexts, and therefore assessment of an artwork should focus on attitudes
expressed in it.[18]
But what of the artist’s real-life behavior when it clarifies what is expressed in a
particular work? Here, Gaut proposes, “[T]he view also allows that the artist’s
personality as manifested outside his work may be relevant, since it is the same
person who acts in both contexts. The test must be whether, in light of one’s
knowledge of the artist’s attitudes outside his work, one can detect in the work
traces of these attitudes.” The test is whether this knowledge leads us to locate
these traces upon further close “inspection” of the work, so that we “see” in a
painting something previously overlooked. If we cannot locate any such trace, the
artist’s behaviors and attitudes are ethically and aesthetically irrelevant.[19]
My central proposal is that this position is mistaken. The relevant ethical merits and
flaws are not limited to what can be seen—or, with music, heard—in the work.
Consider my earlier example of ducks, geese, and foie gras. The mistreatment of the
fowl takes place in a context far removed from the consumption of the delicacy, so
that it is possible to have regularly eaten it without knowing about the animal cruelty
involved in its production. When ethically sensitive diners learn of that cruel
mistreatment, their ensuing disgust is not based on sudden “detection” of something
“in” the food. They do not suddenly become sensitized to a previously unnoticed
manifest property. The ethical flaw remains altogether “outside” the aesthetic object.
Yet it is aesthetically relevant. Analogously, I propose that there are cases where an
artist’s values and attitudes are not reflected in corresponding “traces” in the
artwork, yet where knowledge of them is relevant to its aesthetic assessment. This
result is a straightforward consequence of ontological contextualism, which tells us
that, for any fixed arrangement of non-aesthetic properties that are directly
perceived, there may be rival interpretations that ground distinct experiences of
those properties, and so consequently distinct aesthetic judgments.
Art forgery offers examples in which provenance introduces ethical considerations
that ought to be taken into account when assigning aesthetic value. Forgery is a
category that is concerned with the artist’s behavior. More to the point, it is a
category where knowledge about the creative process ought to influence aesthetic
judgment.[20] Yet the alteration of judgment may occur for knowledgeable viewers
without the intervening step of a discovery of previously overlooked traces within the
work. As Peter Lamarque emphasizes, the forger relies on generating false beliefs
about artistic provenance.[21] The aesthetic failing of a forgery does not depend on
the forger’s doing a bad job in forging another painter’s work or style; aesthetic
failure is not always linked to visible traces of being a forgery. A perfect forgery is
aesthetically bad because the forger has an unethical stance in relation to the
audience, demonstrating that an ethical flaw in the artist can bequeath an aesthetic
flaw in the art despite the absence of ethical problems in the attitudes manifested or
expressed by, or in, the work.
4. Performer and persona
Musical forgery is uncommon. However, it is very similar to artistic insincerity, and at
least two noteworthy categories of insincerity arise from a disparity between the
artist’s public persona, the music performed, and, sometimes, the artist’s non-
performing life. Both kinds of insincerity are found in popular music. The first
category is the more obvious case, where insincerity is an ethical and therefore
aesthetic flaw. The second case is the one where duplicity in the construction of a
public persona enhances the work ethically and aesthetically (e.g., the example of
Victor Willis in section 5). These two categories are important in popular music
because it is dominated by song performance. Consequently, center stage is
normally occupied (both literally and metaphorically) by individual singers, rather
than the music’s composer(s) or its instrumental accompanists. Elaborating on Stan
Godlovitch’s observation that the visible human agency of musical performance
invites the audience to treat “artist and artwork, performance and performer … as
inseparable,” Jeanette Bicknell observes that the standard success criteria for
popular song performance include the audience’s “[c]onviction that this particular
singer is appropriate for this song and vice versa.”[22]
Bicknell chooses to “set aside” the question of whether certain song choices are
morally inappropriate for certain singers.[23] With this move, she restricts her
discussion to the seeming appropriateness of a song and singer: does the singer
perform a particular song with sufficient conviction? This narrowing of focus
presumes that the popular audience does not care whether that conviction is won
through an insincere communication. However, I propose that audiences do care,
and should care. More to the point, insincerity is the most obvious case of an
aesthetically relevant ethical flaw that may reveal no manifest “trace,” where the
attitudes that are manifested in the song performance are not those of the artist, and
where this disparity is relevant to an ethical appraisal and thus to its aesthetic
value.[24] Although there are many cases where insincerity is ethically innocent,
there are also cases where duplicitous insincerity merits ethical condemnation.
Some of these cases become visible only if, building on Bicknell’s notion of a “fit”
between public persona and song choice, we allow the additional move of
considering the potential relevance of real-life behaviors that never come to the
attention of—or which are actively hidden from—the popular audience. But why stop
there? Having granted that an artist’s identity can be an aesthetically relevant aspect
of an artwork’s provenance, and having agreed with Godlovitch and Bicknell that a
performer’s persona enters some musical performances as constitutive elements of
those performances, then we have all the warrant we need to examine a performing
artist’s relationship to her or his public persona.
I take it that all stage behavior during public performance is part of a singer’s public
persona. Perceived as a “folk” singer in the first half of the 1960s, Bob Dylan’s first
appearance onstage with an electric guitar (on July 25, 1965) radically redefined his
persona. Stage banter can also define and redefine a singer’s persona. On March
17, 2013, Michelle Shocked made derogatory comments about same-sex marriage
to a club audience that included a large number of lesbian fans who had interpreted
Shocked’s songs and performances in light of a public history that positioned her as
a radical feminist lesbian.[25] The 2013 incident quickly led to a cancellation of a
tour of American cities. Due to this change in her public persona, we can anticipate
that Shocked’s longstanding fans will appraise all future performances of her
established repertoire differently, on the grounds that it is aesthetically inappropriate
for her to continue to give voice to songs that endorse a degree of personal freedom
that the singer’s persona morally denounces. However, this is simply a variation of
Bicknell’s point about the aesthetic flaw that can arise from a discrepancy between
persona and song selection. The argument that follows moves beyond the fact that
changes in a public persona can deprive a singer of what had been, until then, the
requisite conviction to perform one or more songs.
The crucial cases involve disparities between the singer’s public persona and the
singer’s ethical character. For example, early in Bob Dylan’s career, journalists
discovered that he was supplying a false biography (e.g., his actual name was
Robert Zimmerman and he claimed that he was an orphan, when he was not).
Some journalists published these discoveries. Others sought to discredit him by
relaying the false rumor that he was not the actual songwriter of “Blowin’ in the
Wind.” Most competent listeners can hear that the tune is derivate from the African-
American spiritual “No More Auction Block,” and thus can make an educated guess
about its general provenance, which connects the song to the civil rights movement.
(Lacking this manifest connection to the tradition of African-American spirituals, it is
doubtful that the song would have become one of the anthems of the civil rights
movement.) Yet the American press was not exploring the song’s general
provenance when spreading the false claim that Dylan had purchased the words and
music from a high school student whom Dylan met while visiting Woody Guthrie in a
New Jersey hospital.[26]
Suppose that the rumor was true rather than false. If true, it would (in 1963 and
immediately after) have given good reason to reconsider Dylan’s performances of
the song. Had Dylan purchased the song instead of composing it, performances of
“Blowin’ in the Wind” that displayed an emerging talent that rivaled or overshadowed
his model, Woody Guthrie, would instead constitute the public actions of a musical
charlatan. The fabrications within his Guthrie-like persona are not necessarily a
mark against Dylan’s performances in the early 1960s, but if it were true that Dylan
lied about composing such a significant song, it would be a genuine moral failing of
the singer that would reduce the conviction and power of his performances at that
time. It would certainly be relevant to Dylan’s performance for the March on
Washington on August 28, 1963, as a featured singer prior to the famous “I have a
dream” address by Martin Luther King, Jr.[27] Dylan’s inclusion in one of the
signature events of the American civil rights movement would have been unmerited.
(He sang three of his most recent compositions and the civil rights staple, “Keep
Your Eyes on the Prize,” but not “Blowin’ in the Wind.”)
It might be objected that a song’s true authorship cannot make an aesthetic
difference unless it becomes known, and so it only matters after it enters the singer’s
public persona. However, that objection misunderstands the contextualism that
frames my argument. The primary insight of ontological contextualism is that many
facts about provenance are relevant (rather than that they are relevant only if we
happen to know them). The situation with Dylan’s performances of “Blowin’ in the
Wind” is just as it is with any aspect of provenance that makes an aesthetic
difference: the audience’s ignorance of relevant facts about provenance generates
distorted aesthetic judgments. Furthermore, although aesthetic properties are
response-dependent, our aesthetic reevaluation of Dylan in 1963 upon learning of
the deception would not depend on our suddenly becoming aware of manifest traces
of the lie in Dylan’s performances of 1963.
I am not, however, advancing a general principle about song authorship. I am not
suggesting that being the author of a song always matters in this way. Many artists
besides Dylan sang “Blowin’ in the Wind” with conviction. (In fact, the folk trio Peter,
Paul, and Mary sang it instead of Dylan at the March on Washington.) My only claim
is that some things that are presented as part of a singer’s persona may be
unacceptable elements of that persona—and so also of that performer’s
performances—if they are not actually true of that singer. The relevance of Dylan’s
false claim of authorship, had it been such, lies in its discord with the rapid evolution
of Dylan’s public persona at that time. In sum, the relevance of the rumor about the
authorship of “Blowin’ in the Wind” illustrates that behaviors that are not incorporated
into a singer’s public persona can be morally and aesthetically relevant to a proper
evaluation of that singer’s performances. In the same way that a public persona can
deprive a song performance of conviction, facts about the singer’s private life can
deprive the persona of conviction, too.
5. Reappraisals: negative and positive
Taking stock, my analysis recognizes that there are four distinct ways that ethical
merits and flaws can matter in a song performance. First, a song’s expressive
features often include moral attitudes. Many of Dylan’s songs express harsh moral
condemnation, including the harsh self-criticism of songs like “Idiot Wind.” Because it
is part of the song’s design, self-criticism is expressed when others sing that song.
Second, many songs are designed to solicit particular moral responses from
listeners. The solicited response is often, but need not be, identical to what the song
expresses. Successful performances of “Idiot Wind” encourage listeners to reflect on
their own ignorance and foolishness. In contrast, Randy Newman’s “Short People” is
a clear example where these diverge. The solicited response is quite different from
the cruel bigotry of the song. Quite rightly, Bicknell invites us to look beyond these
two factors to a third variable, the singer’s public persona, for it also enters into the
song’s performance and thus counts as aesthetically relevant.[28] Therefore, when
different singers with dissimilar personae perform the same song, those
performances may solicit distinct moral and thus aesthetic responses. When we
respond to the conviction of a particular performance, we are still within the orbit of
the manifest properties of the music’s performance, and so we remain within the
limits on relevant properties endorsed by Gaut’s ethicism, for the only morally
relevant properties belong to the “artistic acts performed in the work.”
I have argued that Gaut and Bicknell are mistaken in asking us to stop there. If the
attitudes and behaviors that appear in the public persona are relevant, then facts
about the singer’s ethical character can also matter. It seems particularly relevant
when the singer’s character diverges from the singer’s public persona. The singer’s
own moral character is a fourth contribution of the ethical that can make a genuine
aesthetic difference. The remainder of this essay offers additional thoughts about the
complex interplay between a singer’s persona and the singer’s life.
I have acknowledged that public personae evolve, and some of the change is
governed by gossip and tell-all biographies. We might adopt a principle of
interpretive charity, according to which the singer’s conviction in a particular
performance is “walled off” from subsequent changes in the performer’s public
persona. However, once we allow that the singer’s life is relevant to evaluating the
public persona, this is not always the right approach. On the assumption that most
people do not change all that much over the course of their adult lives, later events
in a singer’s life may reveal aspects of character and attitude that provide an
epistemic warrant to reevaluate an earlier period of that person’s life. If Shocked’s
2013 persona leads her fans to reevaluate her 1988 album Short Sharp Shocked,
that is because fans are now considering a fourth factor, her actual moral character
in 2013, which may constitute evidence that her 1988 persona was highly
duplicitous. If her long-time fans now find that they are disgusted by the
performances on Short Sharp Shocked, their revulsion would be parallel to the
difference that it would make if Dylan made a death-bed confession that he really
had purchased “Blowin’ in the Wind” from a high school student in 1963. In short, it is
sometimes appropriate to evaluate the virtual agency that is “in the work” (expanded
to include a singer’s public persona) in light of the “private” life of the musician who
presents that public persona. Therefore, anything we learn about a singer’s life—
including subsequent events—might be relevant to evaluating that performer’s
persona and performances during any point in the singer’s career. I do not mean
that everything is equally relevant. The point should be understood in light of
ontological contextualism, which says that different facts relating to provenance are
relevant with different artists and artworks.
Unless one subscribes to backwards causality and thus the possibility that an
event’s properties can be changed by later events, there is no reason to suppose
that the properties of a particular performance can be changed by later events.
Dylan did not perform “Blowin’ in the Wind” on August 28, 1963, and later events
cannot change that fact. Similarly, insofar as Dylan’s public persona entered into his
performance on that day, the relevant persona is whatever it was at the time of that
performance. Dylan’s taciturn stage presence in the later decades of his life does
not change his persona of the early 1960s, when he was often talkative between
songs. Suppose, agreeing with Bicknell, that the moral attitudes that are manifestly
present in a public persona are the only ones that should be allowed to supplement
the ethical dimensions of the song that is being performed. In that case, audiences
will almost always be making an error if they reevaluate a performance in the light of
subsequent events in the performer’s life. At best, we might consult later events and
behaviors as a basis for thinking that the singer’s public persona had been
misunderstood in some way. In contrast, I am proposing that revelations about a
singer’s persona-independent attitudes and behaviors are potentially relevant to a
moral and aesthetic reevaluation of the singer’s public persona. As such, a
reevaluation of the persona does not have to involve the discovery of previously
overlooked manifest properties of that persona. We might experience retrospective
disgust, just like a diner’s retrospective disgust upon learning more about the
production of foie gras.
It will be useful to offer another example of subsequent events that should be
permitted to inform a moral reevaluation of a popular musician’s public persona as it
enters into a particular performance. The Grateful Dead performed an outdoor
concert in Toronto, Canada, on June 27, 1970. However, a crowd of about two
thousand protesters gathered at the stadium’s entrance and attempted to persuade
others not to pay to see the show. Insisting that music should be free, a number of
protestors tried to force their way in, others climbed over the fences, police officers
were injured, and there was a concern that rioting would erupt. Jerry Garcia, the
Dead’s lead guitarist and nominal leader, spoke to the protestors and offered to
provide a free show in a nearby park—something the group did from time to time in
their home city of San Francisco (and the fact of which was part of their public
persona, prominently documented in two photographs adorning the Live/Dead album
of 1969). Garcia pitched the offer of free music as a solution that would avoid
violence. The group’s public persona and Garcia’s specific remarks encouraged the
gate-crashers to understand that free music was provided in a spirit of generosity
and out of concern for everyone’s well-being. (Garcia seems sympathetic to the
demand for free music when he tells them, “All this is like voluntary in nature.” He
urges “coolness” while they arrange the “free stage.”)
However, these events were filmed and eventually appeared in the documentary
Festival Express, where they are supplemented with interviews of key participants
filmed more than thirty years later.[29] At best, some of them had mixed intentions.
Bob Weir, the Dead’s second guitarist, emphasizes that he was there “to make a
living.” He seems to have regarded the protestors as naïve yet dangerous, thereby
revealing attitudes that did not enter the Dead’s 1970 persona. Festival promoter
Ken Walker is also interviewed. Walker makes it clear that the free music was a
business decision, provided in order to draw the protestors away from the concert
site. In hindsight, it has become apparent that, with the possible exception of Garcia,
the Grateful Dead were resourceful and increasingly savvy capitalists. The band was
their business, and they protected their interests.[30] Much of the audience for the
free concert in Toronto in 1970 might have evaluated the music differently if they
could have known that, in the future, the band’s business practices would serve as a
model for twenty-first century entrepreneurs.[31] If any of the protestors or audience
members from the free show saw Festival Express and heard Weir and Walker talk
about the events of that day, an appropriate response would include some
retrospective disgust about the Dead’s free performance that day in the park.
Disparities between musician and persona do not always generate aesthetic flaws.
Again, the aesthetic reevaluation that arises from discovery of insincerity or duplicity
in a public persona does not have to generate the disclosure of previously ignored
manifest evidence. Consider the disco group The Village People, whom Walter
Hughes singles out as a paradigm of disco music’s initial relationship to
homosexuals in the 1970s.[32] They had numerous hit records that combined
infectious dance beats with homoerotic innuendo, including “Macho Man,”
“Y.M.C.A.,” and “In the Navy.” The potent combination of their songs, music videos,
and visual identity (exploiting and exaggerating various male stereotypes) was not
without its political edge, for their public persona played a role in publicizing gay
subcultural identity that had been largely confined to a few urban centers. At the
same time that their cartoonish public persona supported the gay rights movement,
the Village People also became targets of the homophobic backlash to disco.[33]
In this case, the dissonance between singer and persona arises from the
presumption that the members of the group were, in fact, homosexual in their sexual
orientation. However, lead singer Victor Willis was not. Yet Willis’ voice and stage
presence were at the heart of their public persona, and he composed the lyrics for
several of their major hits. The group’s popularity waned significantly after Willis quit
in 1979. Within the group’s public persona, Willis offered himself as homosexual.
Here, we have a strong parallel to the Michelle Shocked case, but with an important
reversal of evaluative valence. As has been said of the revelation that movie star
Rock Hudson was homosexual, this revelation of sexual orientation “can alter the
dynamics of looking, confirming or bringing out the confusions of the sex comedies
… in a way that unsettles their [sexual] affirmations.”[34] In my estimation, Willis’
presence in The Village People deepens the political dimension of their major hits,
for Willis’ extended practice of performing as “gay” constitutes a critique of the
cultural norms of heterosexual behavior at that time. Minimally, he resisted the deep
homophobia of the era in an admirable way. Admittedly, I am assuming that Willis
would not have been at the forefront of the group if he was cynically exploiting an
emerging music trend. After all, the disco hits of the Bee Gees and other musicians
had already demonstrated that men could succeed within disco while presenting
heterosexual personae, so Willis’ assumption of that persona was not compulsory.
To be fully consistent, I have to allow that there may be relevant facts about Willis
that remain unknown. However, the point remains that there are performing contexts
in which seemingly trivial pop songs are highly politicized social interventions. The
Village People are such a case, and consequently an ethical evaluation of the singer
is relevant to our evaluation of the singer’s public persona. Ontological
contextualism allows that we don’t always know all the important facts, but it reminds
us that unknown facts about provenance may be highly relevant.
I have argued that facts about a performer’s “private” life can be relevant to the
aesthetic character of his or her performances. I recognize that staunch anti-
contextualists have no reason to endorse my argument. Furthermore, I have made
no attempt to develop a principled view of where to draw the line between relevant
and irrelevant facts. However, I have given ontological contextualists a reason to
locate that boundary line.[35]
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